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SUMMARY 
The economic crisis that broke out in the most developed part of the world in 2008 seriously affected the Central-Eastern-
European bank systems. This was no wonder, because these economies were closely linked to the developed countries. 
Firstly, the Central-Eastern-European banks were mostly owned by large Western-European banks, and the management 
of these subsidiaries became tougher due to the asset management problems of their mother banks. The current paper 
examines the deleveraging of bank systems of this area during the crisis and thereafter. A special northern-southern 
division can be observed among the Central-Eastern-European banking systems, where the border is unfortunately at the 
northern border of Hungary. During the crisis, the amount of bank outstandings was mostly determined by the economic 
growth, the starting state of loan-deposit ratio, as well as the uncertainty of sovereign Credit Defalut Spread. In the after-
crisis period the change in outstandings is especially dependent on the non-performing loan ratio and the change in loan-
deposit ratio. Hungary is an “off-line” country for all strong correlated variable pairs, so the decrease in domestic 
outstandings may have country-specific reasons in addition to the general theoretical variables. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The CEE economies were influenced to different 
degrees by the financial crisis that broke out in 2008. The 
local fragile bank systems were the very first victims of the 
crisis, since most of the local banks were owned by large 
Western-European financial institutions. The portfolio 
deterioration of the mother banks made the management 
of the local subsidiaries harder (Tressel, 2010). From 2011 
the local banks were no longer supported by the financing 
sources of their owner, moreover some mother banks 
began to withdraw deposits from their Eastern-European 
branches to meet the consolidation requirements 
prescribed by their home countries. Secondly, most of the 
related countries suffered from the consequences of easy 
or predator lending, so the asset quality worsened severely. 
Thirdly, the sphere of potential debtors decreased due to 
the economic crisis that followed the financial crisis. The 
fourth potential reason fordecreased outstanding loans was 
the intervention of state economic policy. The majority of 
Central-Eastern-European states introduced sectorial taxes 
on financial institutions and strengthened the supervisory 
rules by the recommendation of Basel III. (Tressel, 2010) 
Despite facing the same situation, the financial crisis 
affected the Central-Eastern-European countries in 
different manners. This study is devoted to exploring the 
explanatory factors of the banks’ asset deleverage. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Deleveraging is related to capital leverage. Capital 
leverage refers to the structure of financing, namely the 
ratio between equity and liabilities. It has several 
measurements; in our case capital leverage means the total 
ratio of assets to shareholders’ equity ratio (Burke, 2015). 
Deleveraging means that the enterprises change their 
leverage in each phase of an economic cycle. During 
recovery and overheating, when the profitability is high, 
and the companies need loans to finance their investments, 
the leverage increases. During recession the profitability 
of companies decreases and their aim is to decrease their 
fixed revenues costs. Since interest is such a fixed expense, 
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the companies strive to repay their loans and decrease their 
leverage in order to minimise the interest expenses.  
 Kiss & Szilágyi write that, “We are talking about 
deleverage if due to the changing economic circumstances 
the actors of the economy judge that their leverage is 
exaggerated, and they make economic decisions to build 
down their debt by readjusting their asset structure, so 
deleverage is a synonym for debt repayment” (Kiss & 
Szilágyi 2014: 955). According to the authors the 
deleveraging process proceeds in the following pattern in 
the case of banks: The erupting financial crisis (huge 
amount of bad loans) increases the leverage of banks, since 
the losses can be written off from the equity. Since the 
capital increase has severe limitations during the 
circumstances of a crisis (no profit, high aversion to risky 
investments), the leverage can be restated only by 
decreasing the outstanding and loans.  
On the micro level deleverage means that the 
enterprises are forced to decrease their expenses due to the 
fall in their incomes, thus they minimise their debt level to 
decrease the interest expenses. Secondly, their working 
capital needs are decreasing due to lower sales and their 
investment opportunities are worsening, which decreases 
both their long- and short-term loan demand.  
On the macro level the banks withdraw their 
outstandings. The stock of non-performing loan increases, 
which decreases the equity of banks. The lowering equity 
level forces the banks to decrease lending to meet the 
capital adequacy directives. In addition, the risk-bearing 
ability of banks becomes lower because of the 
deteriorating asset quality, so they turn to less risky 
investments (like state securities) against the more risky 
banks. (De Bond, 2002). 
The above procyclical behaviour of banks was one of 
the most important lessons from the economic crisis that 
started in 2007 (Kovács 2014). Whereas the monetary 
authorities and the governments strived to increase the 
aggregate demand through deficit increase and lowering 
the prime rate, the behaviour of the financial sector 
deepened the crisis. The bank system began a credit crunch 
in answer to the worsening quality of outstanding and 
disappearing liquidity in financial markets, and by doing 
that it decreased the aggregate demand.  
Before the financial crisis the behaviour of bank 
systems was just the opposite. The financial institutions 
increased the volume of outstandings, disregarding the 
bearing risk, which (especially in the real estate market) 
led to the creation of asset price bubbles (Kovács 2014). 
Let us look at how the lending boom leads theoretically 
to create asset price bubbles and how the bursting of 
bubbles leads to withdrawal of banks’ lending activity. The 
assumptions of this model (Acharya & Naqvi, 2011) are 
the following (see also Figure 1):  
1. The riskier an investment idea, the higher the interest 
rate of the loan – line a.  
2. The higher the lending rate, the lower quantity of 
investments made – line b.  
3. The lower the quantity of investments, the lower the 
price of invested assets – line c. 
4. The bigger the risk of an asset, the lower its price – line 
d. 
Figure 1 provides an explanation. The solid line of this 
chart represents the equilibrium among the asset price (real 
estate price), the risk, the interest rate and the level of 
investments.  
 
 
Source: Acahrya &Naqvi, 2011 
Figure 1. Creation of asset bubbles 
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Now let us see how the asset bubbles are created. The 
banks underestimate the expected risk of their loans, and 
therefore line a shifts to rightward and upward, and the 
lending rate falls (from A to A′), and they give larger loans 
for investments, so the size of investment increases from 
B to B′. The increasing demand beats up the asset prices, 
so the risky assets become overvalued and the price-risk 
axis shifts from line d to line d′. The asset bubble is 
established, denoted by the dotted square. 
The burst asset bubble leads the prices down from D′ 
to D″. The decreasing prices throw back the demand for 
investment from C′ to C″, the worsening loan portfolio 
leads to higher real loan rates from B′ to B″. The risk 
aversion of banks increases, so they finance the same risk 
for a higher lending rate (from A′ to A″).  
Consequently the risk bearing attitude of banks is high 
during overheating while the real lending rates are low, 
which leads to increasing investments and increasing asset 
prices. During recession the process is precisely reversed. 
The higher risk version leads to decreasing prices, 
decreasing investments and high real rates.  
The process is self-generating in both ways. Human 
psychology stands behind both, according to behavioural 
finance theory. During overheating exaggerated self-
confidence rules, just as during recession panic explains 
human behaviour (De Bondt 2012).  
A study by Takáts and Upper deals with the sensitivity 
of banks’ loan stock toeconomic cycles (Takáts & Upper 
2013). They examined 39 economic crises where the 
creation of the bubbles advanced the eruption of the crisis. 
They found that recovery from the crisis does not hinder 
the deleveraging (the decrease in lending). They found no 
correlation between the economic growth two years after 
the crisis and the change in loan stock/GDP ratio. They 
conclude that the economic recovery depends on the 
indebtedness of the country and the real rate of interest by 
their examination. 
Deleveraging is natural in an economic recession. 
However, its size matters, and by considering this the 
literature differentiates between “good” and “bad” 
deleverage (Bologna et al. 2014). In good deleverage the 
bank just simply adjusts to the changing economic 
circumstances to avoid bankruptcy. Thus, as the loan 
requests of potential debtors decrease, the bank repays its 
lenders, especially its external, foreign sources, so its 
capital adequacy improves, although its profitability 
decreases. The bank makes its credit terms stringent to 
crowd out the risky debtors, but it remains available to 
solvent debtors. 
We talk about bad deleverageif the fall in loan stock is 
the consequence of rising bad loan stock. In this case the 
fall of loan stock does not improve the capital adequacy, 
since the lowering equity base is caused by the loss from 
bad lending. Thus, the bank is forced to dramatically 
withdraw its outstandings to meet the regulatory 
directives, even if it has to refuse to lend to its good 
customers. This phenomenon is often calledcredit crunch. 
The credit crunch further deepens the recession and 
consequently further worsens the level of bad loans. An 
vicious circle can be established that can be solved only by 
the state (through consolidating the bank through 
purchasing the banks’ bad loans). However if the state’s 
solvency is also weak, only the international financial 
institutions can help.  
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN EUROPE 
Paradoxically the credit crunch that originated in the 
USA caused the largest recession and deleverage in 
Europe. This has basically two reasons.  
The first is that the European banks suffered 
meaningful losses in their direct and indirect American 
investments. The fertilisation effect was examined by an 
IMF study (Cerutti & Claessens 2014). It stated that the 
supply side factors (namely, the factors depending on 
banks) played a bigger role in deleverage than the decrease 
of loan demand. The banks strengthened their credit terms 
due to the fertilisation effect. If the bank or its mother bank 
had large losses in the American outstanding, then the 
bank held in (or was forced to hold in) its outstandings in 
the home market. The fertilisation effect was deepened by 
the bank’s dependency on external sources, since the crisis 
froze the operation of interbank financial markets, thus 
causing a liquidity crisis for banks with a high loan/deposit 
ratio. (Angelides 2011)  
This fertilisation effect was examined by the World 
Bank’s experts in an analysis of the deleverage of Central-
Eastern-European banks (Feyen et al. 2014). The larger the 
dependency of these banks on external sources, the bigger 
the deleverage to repay these external sources. The share 
of foreign equity played no explanatory role in 
deleveraging; it didn’t matter whether the bank was in 
foreign or in domestic hands, the banks decreased the 
lending if the loans were financed from foreign sources.  
A second factor was that in some countries problems 
emerged related to the sovereign debt (Southern-European 
countries, Hungary). Since they did not receive financing 
sources from the markets, they were forced to turn to 
international institutions, which linked their loan to 
meaningful austerity measures. Sothese states could not 
help their economies to recover, and the economic policy 
further deepened the crisis. Naturally the problems with 
sovereign debt had a disadvantageous relation to the 
financing cost of the domestic banks, thus the deleveraging 
was extremely serious in those countries where there were 
problems with the state debt (Vause et al. 2012). 
The mechanism of the European economic crisis and 
deleverage is described in Figure 2 (Bornhorst & Arranz, 
2013).  
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Source: Bornhorst &Arranz 2013 
Figure 2. Linkage between deleverages 
Figure 2 shows the vicious circle of recession. The 
bursting of the mortgage market bubble decreases the 
value of mortgage, which forces the bank to withdraw 
loans in every overdebted sector. The decrease in lending 
decreases residential investments and also decreases the 
income of companies producing commodities (especially 
the income of the contruction industry and automobile 
industry). These companies decline their production, 
which leads to cost reduction programs, laying off staff 
and lower levels of investment. This decreases the income 
of the households, which leads to a further decrease in the 
aggregate demand. The widespread recession is perceived 
by the banks, because their loan portfolio worsens further. 
The lending losses and the emerging risk force them to 
make their credit terms more severe, which negatively 
effects the declining residential and commercial 
investments. (Cerutti 2014) 
The above situation becomes even more serious if the 
state was heavily indebted before the crisis. The recession 
decreases the state’s revenue, and its expenses increase to 
soften the social effect of recession. However, a larger 
deficit is not an option due to the lack of finance. So the 
state increases taxes, decreases public spending and sells  
public property (privatisation) at a very low price (deep in 
recession). This further deepens the crisis.  
The linkage between the sovereign debt rating of 
Central-Eastern-European countries and bank 
deleveraging appears in the study of Benczúr and Kónya 
(2015). They found that the larger the increase in sovereign 
debt Credit Defalut Spreads (later CDS), the larger the 
drop in foreign deposits during the crisis.  
The domestic loan stock significantly decreased in the 
countries of European Union during the crisis 
(Schoenmaker & Peek 2014). This decline was especially 
meaningful in the peripheral countries (in Eastern and 
Southern Europe, as well as in Ireland).  Examining the 
countries’ banks, they stated that the outstandings decline 
was larger in the case of banks consolidated by the state 
than in the case of banks with normal capital adequacy. 
Deleveraging was especially the consequence of lowering 
equity level, which forced the bank to decrease its lending 
to meet the requirements of strengthening bank regulation.  
Deleveraging was examined by one of the World 
Bank’s studies from the aspect of tightening credit terms 
(Feyen et al. 2012). It concluded that the banks operating 
in emerging markets (especially in Eastern Europe) 
tightened their credit terms due to the crisis; however, the 
capital adequacy was the highest here (thanks to the 
mother banks’ support) So the decrease in outstandings 
was not caused by the lack of capital but by other factors 
of the economic situation (recession, high level of non-
performing loans, the cash-flow hunger of mother banks 
and the high loan-to-deposit ratio).   
Finally a comprehensive study of VOXEDU listed the 
triggering factors for deleverage in the European Union 
(Feyen et al. 2013). The study differentiates three factor 
groups of European deleverage –financial, regulational 
and economic political factors. The study provides an 
overview of the effect of market conditions on financial 
factors. Tightening inter-bank market conditions, the 
worsening rating of debtors, problems of foreign currency 
nominated loans and withdrawal of foreign sources were 
listed. Similar conclusions can be found in (Gróf 2016) 
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The regulatory factors relate to the gradual introduction 
of the new Basel-III agreement. The capital adequacy 
requirements began to tighten and encouraged the banks to 
follow less procyclical behaviour. A new aspect is the 
recognition of liquidity risk and new liquidity indicators. 
These strive to encourage the banks to limit their 
outstanding in the medium term.  
The study mentions among the economic political 
reasons that the economic recession was linked with 
austerity packages (tax raises, public expense cuts) in 
several countries facing high public debt. This deepens the 
recession and decreases the number of lendable private 
debtors. The recession limits the income-generating ability 
of banks and hinders the quick write-off of bad loans.  
The banks have another alternative to invest their 
money: they can buy state securities. The collapse of 
domestic outstandings can be compensated by a portfolio 
rearrangement towards the less risky treasury bonds. (Gróf 
201) 
This paper examines the effect of the financial crisis on 
the overall outstanding debt (both private and state) in 
Central and Eastern Europe and examines the speed of 
general recovery after the crisis.  
THE AIM OF RESEARCH AND THE 
APPLIED METHODOLOGY 
The aim of current paper is to examine deleverage in 
the eastern part of the European Union (among the former 
socialist countries). Firstly we examine how the 
deleverage is related to the Central-Eastern-European 
(CEE) countries and how quick has the recovery been 
since 2013 according to the newest available statistics.  
Secondly we distinguished which country’s bank 
system was characterised by “good” or “bad” 
deleveraging. Due to the lack of data, the examination was 
carried out on the whole banking system of the countries 
based on the data of the World Bank, European Central 
Bank and the European Statistical Office, rather than on 
individual banks.  
After separating the “bad” and “good” deleverage we 
surveyed whether there are any sign of domestic 
outstandings increasing after the deepest point of the crisis 
(since 2012) and how the influencing factors of deleverage 
behaved during that period.  
The annual change in corporate and household loan 
was considered as the indicator of deleverage. This was the 
dependent variable. So the total outstanding of the bank 
sector was decreased by the amount of public lending and 
the amount of foreign lending. The reason for this is that 
the primary goal of public lending is not to earn profit, but 
to ensure the required liquidity and capital adequacy. That 
is why the public outstanding (which means mainly the 
purchase of government securities) does not react to the 
shape of economic cycle in the same way as the private 
outstanding.  
Foreign loans – considering the fact that the examined 
region is poor in capital – are not typical outstanding of the 
region’s banks, and here we cannot separate whether the 
foreign income holder is private or public, which wasn’t 
crucial in this analysis.  
Results in the literature suggest that it would be 
worthwhile to examine the role of four factors in the case 
of Central-and-Eastern-European bank systems. These are 
the following:  
1. Fertilise effect from developed (WesternEuropean) 
bank systems  
2. Non-performing loan stock 
3. Current state of the economic cycle 
4. Country risk 
Four explaining variables were created to separate 
these four factors.  
The fertilise effect is strong in a given state if the 
foreign liabilities have a significant stake in the total 
bank’s liabilities. If the mother bank encounters trouble, it 
tries to get more cash inflow, so it tries to reclaim its 
foreign outstanding. In several cases the consolidation 
contracts made between the mother bank and its state also 
prescribe the liquidation of foreign investments. Due to the 
lack of proper data we approached the exposure of 
liabilities from the mother bank using the corporate and 
household loan-to-deposit ratio at the end of 2008. Before 
the crisis, the banks of the examined region had taken on 
significant foreign liabilities to finance the lending boom, 
and their loan to deposit ratio significantly increased.  
H1: The higher the loan-to-deposit ratio, the larger 
the extent of the decrease in domestic outstandings 
during the crisis.  
The decreasing quality of te loan portfolio was 
measured by the change in the non-performing loan 
percentage between 2008 and 2012. Generally the quality 
of loan portfolio was the worst in 2012 in the examined 
country group.  
H2: The larger the quality decrease in the loan 
portfolio, the greater the fall in domestic outstandings.  
The depth of the economic crisis may have a significant 
effect on the size of domestic outstandings, because the 
base of potential solvent customers was decreasing. In 
recession a well managed company keeps its working 
capital level low and makes no unnecessary investments, 
and so its financing needs decrease. The size of the 
economic crisis was measured by the difference between 
the 2008 and 2012 real GDP. I chose this long period 
because the economic crisis followed a “W” shape in most 
of the countries, with two recession depths (in 2009 and in 
2012). The recovery started in 2013.  
H3: The larger the fall in GDP, the larger the 
deleverage.  
The uncertainty of country risk was measured by the 
standard deviation of sovereign debt of the related country 
between the end of 2007 and 2012.  
H4: The higher the volatility of CDS spread, the 
larger the decrease in domestic outstandings.  
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The examined countries can be found in the Eastern 
part of the European Union, among the group of member 
states that joined the EuropeanUnion in 2004 or later: 
Bulgaria, the three Baltic states - Lithuania, Estonia and 
Latvia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The data came from three sources. The GDP was 
downloaded from the Eurostat website, the non-
performing loan ratio came from the World Bank’s 
database and the source of loan and deposit stock was the 
database of the European Central Bank (ECB). The 
historical CDS spreads are available at the website of 
DataGrapple. In the case of Croatia and Latvia the ECB 
database contains no data, while in the case of Slovenia the 
CDS spreads are not available.  
The statistical analysis was made by SPSS 22.0. Due to 
the lack of data there were 8-11 cases, so a scatter plot was 
used to expose the linkage between each of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. The 
stronger is the linkage, the better the plots fit onto a line or 
curve. The research was made both the during- and the 
post-crisis periods.  
RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH 
Firstlythe size of deleverage is ranked by using a 
scatter plot chart (Figure 3) where the horizontal axis 
demonstrates the change in domestic outstandings during 
the crisis and the vertical axis presents the post-crisis 
change in domestic outstandings. The farther a country 
from the lower left-hand corner of the chart, the smaller 
the degree of deleverage (if there even was a leverage.) 
The countries were ranked in descending order by their 
distance from the lower left-hand corner.  
 
 
Source: ECB, own work 
Figure 3. Change of domestic outstandings during and after the crisis 
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 In cr isis After crisis  
Source: ECB, own work 
Figure 4-5. Relationship between domestic outstandings and GDP 
From the chart it can be seen that the largest fall in 
domestic loans was suffered by Slovenia both during and 
after the crisis. The decrease was not significant before the 
crisis, but the drop has increased since 2012. The Baltic 
countries and Hungary (upper left-hand corner) also 
suffered a sharp decline during the crisis, but the size of 
recovery reached the regional average. Romania, Bulgaria 
and the Czech Republic indicate very moderate increases 
in domestic lending in both periods in euro terms. In 
Slovakia and in Poland the size of domestic lending did not 
reflect the crisis; both periods brought a significant 
increase in domestic outstandings. Based on this result the 
following clusters were formed related to the deleveraging 
(based on the distance from the lower left-hand corner).  
1.  Poland, Slovakia – dynamic increase 
2.  Estonia, Latvia, Hungary – strong exposure to the 
crisis 
3.  Bulgaria, Romania – moderate increase 
4.  Slovenia – decaying outstanding 
Lithuania and Croatia weren’t ranked by available data 
and therefore are not represented in the figure.   
In the Central-Eastern-European countries the linkage 
between the domestic outstandings and the GDP during 
and after the crisis is shown by Figures 4 and 5.  
It can be seen in Figure 4 that during the crisis the 
deleverage is clearly explained by the change in GDP. The 
explanation power is 25%, measured by R2. The larger the 
fall in GDP, the more significant the drop in domestic 
outstandings. However, the Baltic States and Hungary 
suffered a bigger drop in lending than the GDP decline. In 
the “above the line” countries (Slovenia, Romania and the 
Czech Republic) the drop in domestic lending was not as 
large as the fall in GDP.  
However, the GDP does not explain so clearly the 
situation after the crisis (Figure 5). Between 2013 and 
2018 Romania and Hungary earned the biggest growth, but 
the expansion in lending was not impressive. The countries 
with expanding domestic loans did not display 
significantly better economic growth.  
One explanation for this phenomenon can be “bad” 
deleveraging. If the bank system has too many bad loans, 
the increase in domestic outstandings may be postponed 
due to the high perceived risk.  
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 In cr isis After crisis  
Source: ECB, World Bank, own work 
Figure 6-7. Relationship of domestic outstandings and bad loans 
The bad loan ratio shown in Figure 6 explains the 
deleverage against the GDP change better in the post-crisis 
period than during the crisis. After the crisis, the biggest 
drop in loan quality occurred in Slovenia, Lithuania and 
Hungary and the deleveraging was the most significant in 
these countries.  
On the other side, Poland and Slovakia had no problem 
with the quality of assets; consequently, the banks’ lending 
could rapidly expand. The increase was less intensive in 
the case of the Czech Republik and Estonia.  
The differences may come from the various changes of 
loan-to-deposit ratio (Figure 7). After the crisis the banks 
strived to bring their loan-to-deposit ratio close to 1, since 
the inter-bank money market was frozen, and some 
regional banks could expect no help from their mother 
banks. The explanitory power of loan-to-deposit ratio 
remains after the crisis. During the crisis I used the opening 
balance of loan-to-deposit ratio (Figure 8), while in the 
post-crisis period I used the change of loan-to-deposit ratio 
(Figure 9). After the crisis, the lack of domestic deposits 
may have constrained the increase in private lending.  
 
 
 In cr isis After crisis  
Source: ECB, own work 
Figure 8-9. Relationship between domestic outstandings and the loan-to-deposit ratio 
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 In crisis After crisis  
Source: ECB, DataGrapple, own work 
Figure 10-11. Relationship between domestic outstandings and standard deviation of CDS spread 
It can be seenin Figure 8 that the dependence on 
domestic deposits explains well the change in domestic 
lending. In 2008 the domestic outstandings significantly 
decreased in the net lending countries. Where the bank 
system had a significant domestic deposit base (the 
Visegrad countries except for Hungary) the amount of 
domestic outstandings increased against the crisis. 
Although Hungary is an “under-the-line” country, the loan 
stock decreased more than could be explained by the loan-
to-deposit ratio.  
After the crisis, the outstandings increase if the 
deposits increase and vice versa. If the deposits decrease, 
the lending decreases regardless of the state of economy. 
The linkage is much stronger than in the crisis period. 
Where the deposits grow, the banks utilise the situation 
and increase their lendings.  
Finally. let us look at the effect of sovereign debt risk 
on the stock of CEE domestic outstandings. The sovereign 
risk is considered to be zero in the case of Estonia since its 
public indebtedness is extremely low; there is no listed 
CDS spread on Estonian public debt.  
From Figure 9 it can be seen that the uncertainty of 
sovereign risk spread moderately affects the level of 
outstandings. The linkage is almost negligible. It appears 
that domestic outstandings are not sensitive to the 
volatility of macroeconomic risks.   
It is important to note that there is a strong linkage 
between the non-performing loan ratio and the risk of 
sovereign debt ranking. A correlation matrix of the 
available independent variables revealed a not significant 
but medium-strong correlation (0.8) between these two 
variables during the crisis. In the post-crisis period, 
however, this linkage disappeared.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions can be drawn from studying 
the figures and data:  
1. The change in domestic outstanding was determined by 
the loan-to-deposit ratio, the GDP and the bad loan 
ratio in this order. The CDS spread has no explanatory 
power. However, the weight of the explanation 
variables are different in the crisis and the post-crisis 
period. The GDP has stronger explanatory power in the 
crisis, but the NPL and loan-to-deposit ratio are better 
in the post-crisis period.  
2. Hungary was one of the two countries (near Slovencia), 
where the deleverage was the most serious. This may 
be the consequence of two factors. Firstly, the 
Hungarian bank system has got an accumulated 
drawback situation; all of the bank specific explaining 
factors (loan-to-deposit ratio, GDP growth, non-
performing loan, and risk of sovereign debt) have poor 
figures during and after the crisis. The only exception 
was the post-crisis economic growth, where the 
performance of Hungary was fairly good between 2013 
and 2015. The second reason may be that the 
Hungarian bank sector was burdened by several special 
levies (sectorial bank tax introduced firstly in the 
region with heavy tax rates, consolidation of foreign 
currency nominated mortgage loans, transaction tax, 
etc.) These levies limited the profit generating ability 
of Hungarian banks and also limited the quick write-
off of accumulated bad loans.  
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